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Legal Norms’ Distinctiveness in Legal Transplants and Global Legal Pluralism
By Toby S Goldbach*

I. INTRODUCTION: TRANSFERS AND CLASHES
“Law is on the move.”1 States transplant foreign rules or procedures to improve
commercial activity or as part efforts to harmonize political and legal systems.2 Foreign laws are
also used as instruments in development projects, where increasingly these projects emphasize
legal norms such as transparency or accountability as ends in themselves.3 This is the case in
projects that promote the Rule of Law or democratic freedom as the key to progress4 but also
with the rise of constitutionalism as an organizing concept or archetype in legal thought.5 Yet
scholars have historically described deep connections between legal institutions and national

* JSD Candidate, Cornell University. Much of the thinking in this paper follows on research and ensuing
conversations with Peter Katzenstein and Benjamin Brake and I am grateful to them for their insights and ideas. Any
errors are solely my own. Thank you to Odette Lienau and Mariana Mota Prado for helpful comments and
suggestions on this early draft.
1
John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law
and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977)
2
See generally THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HARMONIZATION (Mads Andenas and Camilla Baasch Andersen, eds.
2011); Anne-Marie Slaughter & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 457 (Beth A. Simmons & Richard H. Steinberg, eds. 2006).
3
Ronald J. Daniels, Michael J. Trebilcock & Lindsey D. Carson, The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law
Inheritance and Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111 (2011); MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF
PROGRESS (2008);
4
Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 315 (2004); David Kennedy,
The ‘Rule of Law,’ Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
5
Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000 in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4; sar Rodr ue -Garavit, Toward a sociology of the global rule of law field:
neoliberalism, neoconstitutionalisms, and the contest over judicial reform in Latin America, in LAWYERS AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Yves Dezalay and Bryant G Garth eds., 2011); and Alvaro Santos, The
World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3.
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identities,6 or between legal culture and state history.7 National identities are thought to be
reflected in how states administer justice – in their courts and justice procedures.8 The
transnational movement of legal norms is thus “a subject of profound political importance and
controversy.”9
This paper examines the transnational movement of law and legal pluralism in the
transnational domain in order to play with a specific question: whether legal norms are
distinctive or whether there is a distinctive way that legal norms operate in practice. It engages
with the International and considers two empirical domains or sets of disciplines: Legal
Transplants and Global Legal Pluralism. Both reflect on the relationships between multiple
overlappin le al orders, and between “donors” and “recipients” in interactional legal practices.
These disciplines point to moments of problem-articulation, periods of translation, and practices
of acceptance and recognition. The paper suggests preliminary conclusions about the
distinctiveness of legal norms, specifically that there is an aesthetic to law reform or legal
instrumentalism and to a practice of recognition between overlapping normative options, both of
which generate a particular kind of fidelity to law and legal norms.
The paper is an initial attempt to work through three broad themes that will ground a larger
project. The first is to bridge international and domestic domains as sites of interaction by
focusing on the transnational movement of law and legal transplants. Cotterrell aptly writes:
To invoke an idea of transnational law is to suggest that law has new sources, locations, and
bases of authority. Addin “transnational” to “law” is like addin a question mark:
queryin modern Western jurisprudence’s state-centered understanding of law. It is also to
query whether ideas and methods in international law need revising, to accelerate the
ongoing development of this field away from its traditional focus on the relations of states,
toward a broad concern with the regulatory problems of international society.10

6

Mirjan Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A omparative Approach to the Legal Process (1991);
Laura Nader, The ethnography of law (1965).
7
James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279 (2000).
8
Neil Vidmar & Valerie Hans, American Juries: the Verdict (2007); Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
Aboriginal Peoples and the Justice System: Report of the National Round Table on Aboriginal Justice Issues (1993).
9
Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, The Transnational Spread of American Law, APSA 2011 Annual Meeting
Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1901131
10
Cotterrell (2012), at 502-503.
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Scholars, especially International Relations (“IR”) scholars have identified structures of
global governance beyond domestic legal institutions and the legalizing of international
institutions as relevant objects of study when engaging with the topic of law in the international
domain.11 In these and other research projects there is often a separation between domestic
(municipal) and International Law (“IL”), which is conceptually neat but unrealistic in the legal
world. For example, Private International Law, which encompasses commercial disputes that
cross national boundaries, is addressed in international dispute resolution institutions such as the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (e.g. US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp, 1998).
However, important cases with international implications are still being decided in domestic
courts (Filanto Spa v Chilewich International, 1992; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, 2013). This
paper follows other efforts to bridge the domestic and international in thinkin about law’s
relevancy.12 Here there are opportunities to examine the various ways that law interacts with and
impacts on the international, for example in “transnational communal networks,”13 global legal
pluralist orders14 and transnational legal orders.15
One of the main concerns for IR scholars is why states comply with IL when there is no
supra-national enforcement mechanism. As a legal domain where obligation and enforcement is
uncertain, IL provides an opportunity to think about whether and how law exerts a “compliance

11

GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, eds.
2003); Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, & Duncan Snidal, The
Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000); JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS
(2001).
12
Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 738, 742 (Jan Smits ed.,
2006).
13
Roger Cotterrell, What Is Transnational Law?, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 500 (2012).
14
Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225 (2009); Ralf Michaels, Global
Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243 (2009); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1155 (2007).
15
Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 229-230 (2012);
Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders (May 2012) (unpublished paper, presented at the
International Conference on Law and Society, Hawaii, June 8, 2012, on file with author) (arguing that industry
invention, transformations in national economies, or even changes in leadership of international organizations are all
factors in the transformation of transnational legal orders) and see generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING
AND STATE CHANGE (Gregory C. Shaffer, ed. 2013).
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pull.”16 In other words, the way law “function(s) in a horizontal normative order such as
international society”17 provides clues as to the distinctiveness of legal norms. Similarly, legal
transplants and global legal pluralism, as sites of multiplicity and hybridity in law, are also
examples of contingent compliance or obligation to legal systems. Legal transplants and pluralist
legal orders are sites of clashes, indeterminacy, multiple overlapping claims to legitimacy, and
places were norms are sources of “resistance, contestation and adaptation.”18 Here legal norms
are “in jeapordy”, not in the sense that there is concern about whether or not legal norms can be
enforced.19 Instead, contingency is implicated in fragmentation of legal regimes and multiple
overlappin sometimes contradictin choices for le al rules and institutions. “Juristic
innovation” in interpretin and mana in le al complexity20 will have something to say about
whether there is anything particular about legal work and how legal norms are distinctive.
The second broad theme is to begin to see judges as an object of study not in their capacity
as decision makers but as part of an epistemic community21 that is involved in developing and
institutionalizing new court procedures or methods for dispute processing. Examples of the ways
that judges are involved in court reforms include the use of new “problem-solvin courts”22 or
“therapeutic jud in ,”23 (e.g. domestic violence courts, conciliation family courts), or judicial
involvement in promoting lay participation in criminal trials.24 This theme takes as its starting
point the phenomenon of legal pluralism or fragmentation of law generally, and of courts and
court procedures more specifically.25 Under this view, what happens at court is no longer typified

16

Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Constructivism and International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012)
17
Jutta Brunn e & Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 9
(2010).
18
Berman (2009), at 230-231.
19
Cotterrell (2012), at 516.
20
Cotterrell (2012), at 504.
21
Haas
22
See e.g. Greg Berman, Greg, John Feinblatt, & Sarah Glazer, Good Courts: The Case for Problem-Solving Justice,
(2005).
23
See e.g. Bruce J Winick & David B. Wexler, Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the
Courts (2003).
24
See infra section
25
Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory (2006)
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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by a single type of procedure and specialized courts with different types of judicial functions
now feature in multiple jurisdictions.26
The paper intermittently relies on examples of judges involved in the international domain.
These examples highlight the legal and political implications of judicial activities that are not
decision-making per se. There are numerous sites where jud es en a e in or are ‘active’ in
shaping law. For example, the domestic judiciary acting as a major branch of government
currently features as the foundational thinking in Law and Development programs.27 The World
Bank’s website announces that Justice Systems Matter for Development. “Justice institutions are
important in determining the extent to which these societal expectations are reali ed…” They
have “specific instrumental roles” in “fosterin private sector rowth” and in “ensurin
compliance of private sector actors and citi ens with le al and re ulatory frameworks.”28
Moreover, paradoxical visions of judges domestically and internationally point to a fundamental
underlying self-doubt about law that is currently circulating in scholarship and the legal
community. Judges and courts are thus sites of investigation in a project about whether legal
norms are distinctive because they embody concerns about law as a tool for social change.29
The third move is to shift the focus in thinking about distinctiveness of legal norms away
from definitional perspectives to practice or interactional explanations. This is analogous to
Robert Borofsky’s recommendation to focus on social performance rather than merely on
intellectual content in understanding knowledge.30 Borofsky argues that to focus on content at
the expense of social performance neglects important aspects of what people know. Similarly,

26

Mitchel de S -O -L'E Lasser, Judicial Transformations: The Rights Revolution in the Courts of Europe (2009)
Bryant G Garth, Law and society as law and development, 37 LAW SOC. REV. 37:305, 306 (comparing the present
focus with past Law and Development programs which focused on lawyers, legal education and corporate law
systems); Duncan Kennedy (2006), supra.
28
The World Bank has spent more than $850 million on funded projects “dedicated specifically to assistin
developin countries in establishin efficient and effective justice systems “ in particular “focused primarily on
improvin the performance of courts”.
29
On doubting the Law and Society movement, Robert Din wall concludes that “The result of thirty years mainly
doing empirical work on topics of policy or public relevance is a view that none of it really matters very much. At
best, scholars are conceptive ideolo ists… Research is normally a le itimation for what decisionmakers have
already decided to do.” Robert Din wall, A Stranger at the Table: Reflections on Law, Society, and the Higgs Boson
36 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 29 (2002).
30
Robert Borofsky, On the Knowledge and Knowing of Cultural Activities, in ASSESSING CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY (Robert Borofsky ed., 1994).
27
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the paper takes a kind of anthropological turn to an IR conversation – that of the distinctiveness
of legal norms.
The paper proceeds in three sections. The next section briefly reviews scholarship on legal
norms in the international domain in order to set the stage for moving to the transnational and
transactional to look for legal norms’ distinctiveness. The third and fourth sections look at
relational accounts in legal transplants and global legal pluralism respectively. These sections
build on an understanding of a practice of legality and collaborative norm-making and try to
identify the types or modes of collaborative norm-making as they manifest in competitive and
contingent legal spaces. The paper concludes with tentative claims about the distinctiveness of
legal norms.
II. THE PROBLEM OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN
A. Legal Norms and Obligation
Two related questions or concerns often trouble legal scholars interested in the international
domain. First, is the broad jurisprudential question: if the definition of law is rules given by the
sovereign to persons under its command,31 then is “law between nations” really law and part of a
legal system, or is it merely an honor system of guided morality?32 With the proliferation of
international treaties, legalized international organizations, this question has lost potency and
consequently receives less attention than the second more functional question. The second
perennial question subsists: what motivates states to abide by legal commitments? How does law
create obligation and bind states in the absence of a centralized overarching authoritative body
that can enforce it?33 In other words, is there a particular way that law generates internalized

31

Austin, Hart, Kelsen
Jack Goldsmith, & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1822 (2009); Joshua Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International
Law is Law, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451 (2009-2010) (“There is an intuition that international law is not actually law
at all, that though it goes by the name of "law" it is in fact closer to politics, or moral exhortation, or aspiration, or
pretense.”)
33
Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT'L ORG. 379 (1999)
32
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compliance or obedience?34 It is within this second set of questions where legal scholar engage
in interesting ways with questions about how law works or whether legal norms are distinctive.
International legal scholars address functional, causal curiosities to find the source of what
motivates and precipitates compliance with IL.35 Several scholars provide detailed accounts of
IR theory and the impact of legal commitments in guiding state behavior36 and this does not need
to be reviewed here. It will suffice to say that at a most general and superficial level, IR Realists
who believe that power and the distribution of material capabilities instructs states in an anarchic
world37 are not overly concerned with IL. On the other hand, law finds advocates in liberal and
neo-liberal theories,38 which tend to be more interested in ideas, interests and international
organizations that enable and constrain state behavior.39 A third possibility for law
internationally, taken from constructivist theories in IR, is that legal norm diffusion and the
socializing effects of norms enable, shape and constrains state behavior.40 Constructivist theories

34

Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997).
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood, International
Law and International Relations Theory A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367
(1998); R. O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L. J. 487 (1997);
Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics, 53 INT’L ORG. 379 (1999). International Relations (IR)
scholars concerned with the relations between states ask the following set of questions: Do states comply with
treaties and international organizations because compliance saves on transaction costs associated with having to
renegotiate treaties? Are states concerned with reputational stakes and other instrumental self-interested rational
action? Do states merely use law to pursue their own interests (instrumental optic) or is there some causal normative
force to law or legitimacy? Are there structural ideational and institutional legal effects, such that law constrains
state behavior by forming the basis on which actions must be justified?
36
Keohane (1997); Brunnée & Toope (2012), supra; Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner,
International Organization and the Study of World Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 645 (1998); Abbott et al (2000).
37
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International
Politics 93 (1979) (“Anarchy entails relations of coordination amon a system's units, and that implies their
sameness…” and in contrast to the domestic system, the international-political system contains like units (e.g. states)
that are not differentiated by the functions they perform); HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF
ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (1977).
38
Robert Jervis, Realism in the Study of World Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 971 (1998).
39
Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513
(1997); Lisa Martin & Beth Simmons, Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions, 52 INT’L ORG.
729 (1998).
40
Brunn e & Toope (2012); Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to ‘Leglization’: Richer Views of
Law and Politics, 55 INT’L ORG. 743 (2001); Michael Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and
Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999). The idea of the socializing effect of law is
35
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claim that institutions, interests and identities are formed in relational settings that may be prestructured or pre-constituted in ways that make them connected and somewhat indivisible. For
example, anarchy in the international system does not exist apart from the practices that create
structures of identities and interests.41
Constructivists challenge assumptions that interests are exogenously given and rationally
pursued. Interests and identities are “socially constructed products of learning, knowledge,
cultural practices and ideology.”42 To speak of state interests or state preferences in
understandin state behavior does not make sense without reference to “social facts” and the
“irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action.”43 Agents and structures mutually
constitute and it is throu h “interaction and communication [that] actors generate shared
knowledge and shared understandings that become the background for subsequent
interactions.”44
The source of IL’s influence is thus ideational and interactional. Norms have a prescriptive
force that “exert a profound impact on how people think about state roles and obli ations, and
therefore on state behavior.” 45 But, in addition, legal norms are created, articulated and
constructed through repeated interactions, through norm enunciation and interpretation and
through processes of cyclicality and recursivity.46 The resulting institutions, such as sovereignty
and anarchy, constitute identities which then figure in interest formation.47 Thus in a critical
account of sovereignty, Antony Anghie argues that legal positivist norms which constructed a

more common in research on domestic law and falls under the general heading of Law and Society; see e.g. Susan S.
Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 323 (2005).
41
Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG.
391, 394-395 (1992)
42
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 202 (1996).
43
John Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,
52 Int’l Or . 855, 856 (1998) (scholar need to acknowled e the constitutive rules to explain the ori ins of
international relations and to rescue structure from bein treated “as the reified residue left behind by long-ceased
historical processes”).
44
Brunn e & Toope (2010), at 13.
45
Keohane (1997), at 492; Friedrich Kratochwil, The Force of Prescriptions, 38 INT’L ORG. 685 (1984)
46
Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity of Global Normmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANNU. REV. LAW. SOC. SCI.
263, 269 (2009) (recursivity in law includes the “rounds, or cycles, or turns, or feedback effects, or episodes” of
legal normmaking).
47
Wendt (1992); Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood (1998), at 373.
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particular meanin of soverei nty enabled a colonial confrontation between states and ‘nonstates’.48 For those scholars who are more hopeful about the possibility of international legal
practices, two questions remain. First, under what conditions are legal norms going to be
effective; under what conditions will legal rules, practices and institutions have a causal impact
on international actors?49 The second, more relevant question for this project is whether there
something particular to legal norms, something in the quality of legal that makes compliance
with legal norms different or more effective?50 “[D]o legal norms, as a type, operate differently
from any other kinds of norms in world politics?”51
Those adhering to neo-liberal institutional IR theories tend to understand law and legal
norms in a legal positivist, Hartian sense, where formal criteria such as secondary rules of
recognition engender internal feelings or beliefs about being obliged.52 On the other hand,
scholars more interested in constructivist theories and in the link between legal legitimacy and
social practice have tended to see legal norms as being inherently connected to natural justice
principles and procedures (however defined).53 Martha Finnemore, Stephen Toope and Jutta
Brunn e in various articles and texts have explicitly linked feelings of obligation in IL to Fuller’s

48

Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law,
40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1 (1999); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005)
49
Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood (1998), at 380.
50
Keohane (1997), at 492.
51
Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms Distinctive, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 699, 701 (1999-2000). This has
lead scholars to investigate the foundations of legal obli ation more enerally. See Brunn e & Toope 2010, 6 (“the
key to understanding the role that law plays in international society lies in understanding the nature and operation in
practice of le al obli ation.”). Norm diffusion and international law theory has understandably proceeded in step
with modern legal jurisprudence which moves beyond Austinian concepts of law. Law is not (merely) sovereign
commands backed by threat of force. Rather, le al norms en ender a sense of obli ation because of law’s le itimacy
and the respect it carries. But then the question devolves into defining legitimacy. See Hurd 1999, at 381 (At its
most basic, le itimacy relates to the “normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ou ht to be obeyed.” This
is a subjective, relational perception that shapes how the actor sees his or her interests); Keohane 1997, 491
(Le itimacy relates to criteria internal to the rule and “is related to the process by which it is created, its consistency
with accepted eneral norms, and its perceived fairness or specificity”); and Slaughter 1997, 379 (It is the process
throu h which law is “created, interpreted and applied” has distinctive effects on international behavior).
52
H L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 88 (1994).
53
Finnemore Toope (2001); Brunn e & Toope (2010).
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eight desiderata outlined in The Morality of Law,54 which are for Fuller the minimum qualities
for a set of rules to be properly called a legal system.55 Brunée and Toope argue that the only
way that legal obligation can claim to be distinctive is to the extent that the criteria are internal to
law.56 Creating and applying law through processes which satisfy Fuller’s criteria of le ality
leads to a “practice of le ality” that generates fidelity and obligation.57 Thus the distinctiveness
for Finnemore, Toope and Brunn e stems from particular le al processes that adhere to
principles of fairness and natural justice. Law is about process more than about form or product:
“Much of what le itimates law and distin uishes it from other forms of normativity are the
processes by which it is created and applied – adherence to legal process values, the ability of
actors to participate and feel their influence, and the use of legal forms of reasoning.”58
B. Moving away from Procedural Criteria
These procedural approaches to legal norms raise several problems, the answers to which
suggest possible shifts in the object of study. First, there is still the concern of pairing IR theories
with IL. At first blush, this is a natural pairing – ‘IR’ and ‘IL’ scholars have a shared sense of the
external environments they seek to explain and the problems that they are facin . They “see the
same world outside their office windows”– a world of formal institutions, organizations, treaties
but also a globalized world that is challenging both state sovereignty and relevance of formal
state-based law. 59 The IR scholar’s concern about whether IL is relevant to IR has a channeling
effect and leads to a natural focus on obligation in absence of state authority (it therefore makes
good sense to go to analytic jurisprudence post-Austin as a source for theories about legal
obligation beyond threat of force).

54

Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887
(1998); Finnemore (1999), at 705 (“Law is le itimate only to the extent that it produces rules that are enerally
applicable, exhibit clarity or determinacy, are coherent with other rules, are publicized (so that people know what
they are), seek to avoid retroactivity, are relatively constant over time, are possible to perform, and are congruent
with official action.”)
55
Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 39 (1964).
56
Brunn e & Toope (2010), at 12 (Formal criteria and institutional organizational factors do not provide an account
of how legal obligation is analytically different from institutional structural obligation).
57
Brunn e & Toope (2010), at 13.
58
Finnemore & Toope (2001), at 750.
59
Slaughter, Tulumello & Wood (1998), at 370.
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However, a sole focus on International law captures only part of the activities and methods
of law’s lobal operation.60 Sally Engle Merry writes that “law’s internationali ation” is not
merely a product of IL, but rather is the result of “transnational movements such as colonialism,
contemporary transnational activism, the creation of a new world order of negotiated contracts
and agreements linking together diverse states, the expansion of human rights activism and
institutions, and the transplantin of le al institutions themselves.”61 Expanding the object of
study to include the transnational movement of domestic law and the plural global legal orders
allows for a consideration of other effects on state power both domestically and internationally.
For example, the global rise of judicial review both in supra-national courts62 and in
constitutional courts resulting from constitutional reform in over eighty countries has affected a
transfer of power to the judiciary and the creation of an international “juristocracy”.63 The
movement of both public and private law legal norms (including court reforms, commercial
codes, development of property systems) impacts on the institutional architecture of the state,
shifting the allocation of authority between different state institutions.64
The importance of looking at transnational spaces is discussed in greater depth in the next
section. Suffice it to say here that once the IR/IL pair has been decoupled, we can return to
Brunnée and Toope’s emphasis on reciprocity in buildin shared understandin s and upholdin
practices of legality. Their interactional account provides a window into thinking about law as a

60

Berman (2009), at 232.
Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology and International Law, 35 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 99 (2006).
62
As of 2006, twenty-five permanent International Courts were operational; Karen Alter, The Multiple Roles of
International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlment, Constitutional and Administrative Review, in
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Internatinal Law and International Relations: The State of the Art 345 (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds. 2013) (arguing that states have delegated four roles to judges – enforcement,
constitutional review, administrative and dispute settlement. In their constitutional role, courts assess the legal
validity of legislative and government actions).
63
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS & CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 1112, 169-170 (2004) (adopting a realist explanation of the rise of constitutionalism and arguing that
constitutionali ation of ri hts “is evidence that the rhetoric of ri hts and judicial review has been appropriated by
threatened elites to bolster their own position in the polity””). Ran Hirschl, The Realist Turn in Comparative
Constitutional Politics, 62 POL. RES. Q. 825 (2009) (discussing realist and contextualist explanations of
constitutional courts and judicial review); THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006);
Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing As a Problematic Topic in Comparative
(Constitutional) Law, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 555 (2008)
64
Shaffer (2012), 245; Halliday (2009).
61
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social phenomenon, about ongoing and sustained practice in legal creation and adaptation, and in
the way legal actors collaborate to build shared understandings in law.65
Unfortunately, an interactional and constructivist account of legal norms that relies on
Fuller’s criteria of le itimacy, while intuitively pleasing, is ultimately inaccurate and misleading.
Fuller’s principles qualify legal positivism rather than replace it.66 These “more substantive
considerations” only work to overturn presumptions of validity and legitimacy that are conferred
by formal criteria.67 More importantly, Fuller’s criteria are aspirational and idealistic, whereas
we know that constructivism and repeated social interaction is not always an altogether happy
affair.68 Constructivism as a theory posits that social interaction, communication and discourse
construct preferences and shape identities. Ongoing interaction and processes of consideration
and review are not necessarily linked to an ex ante quality of norms. In other words, legitimacy,
rather than being a descriptive term, is method of appraisal undertaken ex post.69
The best way to understand fundamentally what law is about is to go to our experience of
law, grounded in everyday life and our professional formation as legal actors. This suggests that
the procedural criteria in law-making may not represent the most important aspects of our
“experience of law” in shaping fidelity and compliance.70 Following Sally En le Merry’s
su estion of “studyin up,”71 one ought to look at how fidelity is created, at knowledge
practices “particular points of intersection, technolo ies of legality, and sites of negotiation
amon multiple systems of law.” This approach of “studyin up” fits better with a constructivist
65

Finnemore & Toope (2001), at 743 (law is a social phenomenon that is embedded in “practices, beliefs and
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law giver and citizen, and in protecting the citizen from arbitrary and authoritative power. Where international law
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67
Friedrich Kratochwil, On Legitimacy, 20 INT’L RELATIONS 302, 305 (2006).
68
See generally, CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth & Craig Parsons, eds.
2010), and notwithstandin Koh’s assertion that a constructivist approach “reco ni es the positive transformational
effects of repeated participation in the le al process.” On the negative, unintended consequences of law, see THE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: STUDIES ON LAW AND SOCIAL CONTROL (Richard L. Abel ed. 1982)
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theory interested in outcomes of social interaction. The task then is to reconstruct the beliefs and
values that make up our experiences in social practices and institutions: “we may by
understanding its component parts be able to get some purchase on what in practice we already
take the law to be.”72 For example, is there a way to investigate the creativity in and impulse to
invent varieties of normative technologies73 as a source for law’s distinctiveness? Rather than
investigating the aspirational descriptive qualities of legal procedural fairness, do relationships
movements of law and legal transfers point to distinctiveness in legal technologies, in the ways
that law operates as an instrument?
III. LAW IN PRACTICE IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF LAW
A. Transfer and Clashes in Transnational Legal Processes74
The conflicts and possibilities in legal transplants highlight the contingency of legal orders
and “the law-creating potential of complex, interpenetrating networks of social relationships of
community.”75 Multiple legal products impact processes in the movement of law, transnational
legal determinations about valid law, and the construction and transfer of legal meaning across
geopolitical and cultural boundaries.76 These areas highlight the interactional nature in the
development of legal norms, and the conflict and competition77 in setting agendas for articulating
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legal orders in a polymorphic legal world.78 They account for interactions between international
and domestic laws as well as the syncretism present in current legal thinking and practice. 79
My suggestion is that the construction and transnational flow of legal norms are places to
look for clues about the distinctiveness of legal norms. In these transnational spaces, the concern
is not the lack of a hierarchical state order to enforce legal obligations, but rather the plurality of
options and the prospect of conflicting legal orders. Understanding transnational domains and the
relationships between donors and recipients in the movement of law requires a similar
decoupling of law from “hierarchically ordered imposition of social control emanatin from a de
facto soverei n.”80 But unlike IL, the problem is not just how to operate in a horizontal world,
but additionally the contingency expressed in coexisting legal orders with multiple legitimacies
and normative claims. The interactions, collisions, “iterative interplays” and resulting modes of
norm-making may have something to tell us about the distinctiveness of law.
Legal actors in transnational arenas include public and private actors, disaggregated-state
officials who meet to discuss common governance functions,81 international development
agencies,82 and professionals acting in networks, epistemic communities and in quasi legal
institutions (WTO, ICSID, ISO).83 Networks of domestic judges increasingly intervene in
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discussions about domestic legal reforms and court administration. Judges meet counterparts in
other countries, with international organizations such as the Council of Europe and The World
Bank to discuss everything from foundations in the rule of law, anti-corruption measures, client
service and communication, to court administration management skills, records management to
improving signs and installing help desks as a way to improve court accessibility for
unrepresented accused, litigants and witnesses.84
For example, the National Judicial Institute in Canada, which has traditional focused on
education of local judiciary, has become increasingly involved in transnational projects in the
Philippines, Ukraine, China and Ghana.85 A two-year Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA) funded project called JUSTICE (Judicial Systems Improvement for Commerce
and Economy) was implemented by the NJI “to promote economic development in the
Caribbean, Africa, and South America by offering local judges and court authorities help in
establishing more efficient, accessible, and dependable judicial systems.”
Actors often have agendas in promoting the flow of legal norms. Legal norms may also
flow “less consciously” throu h intensified cross-border economic, professional and cultural
interactions. There are thus tensions and conflicts in the movement of legal norms.
B. Legal Transplants
“Legal transplants” refers to the movement and reception of a law between states.86 The
concept invokes the difficulties in the relationships between recipients/donors,
diffusion/reception, and points to the mutually constitutive relationships between migratory and

and economic resources into le al processes”). Scholars and academics articulate ideas that can be translated into the
international arena; see e.g. Catherine Weaver, The Meaning of Development, Constructing the World Bank’s Good
Governance Agenda, in CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 47 (Rawi Abdelal et al. eds., 2010) and
Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006), for a
discussion of the infusion of “ ood overnance” norms into discourse at the World Bank.
84
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local law.87 The process of transplanting law emphasizes domestic differences, and studies have
investigated reasons for acceptance and resistance in the movement of law, including differences
in the types of legal transfers sometimes referred to as “or anic” versus “mechanical”,88 and
le al families’ or le al ori in theories.89 Some of these studies have been critiqued for not
accounting for “transplant effects” and subsequent institutional changes, for example in colonial
territories.90 The point to highlight here is that legal transplants must overcome obstacles in a
new legal system and will be affected by processes for exporting and importing legal systems,
the characteristics that inhere in the transplanted law itself, and the ability to graft onto existing
legal norms and practices.91
The relationships between donor and recipients suggest recurring themes in transnational
law and legal movements. In particular, legal transplants highlight the places of competition,
power and politics in the relationships between legal donors and legal recipients. Yves Dezalay
87
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Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR.
ECON. REV. 165 (2003).
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and Bryant Garth have been involved in multiple research projects lookin into “competitive
processes” implicated in the movement of law, in particular in “creatin and maintainin a
demand for transnational norms.”92 They find that Judges, multinational firms, and business
litigators have worked to promote a U.S. style litigation approach as the standard for
international commercial arbitration.93 Similarly, Halliday notes the politics and power shifts
between the market and the state even in highly technical regulatory reforms such as corporate
bankruptcy law reform.94 ountries in the “Global South” received national corporate
bankruptcy transplants induced by persuasion, material benefits and on occasion “economic
coercion”. International financial institutions (IFIs) use financial bailouts to induce states to
accept legal transplants that included legal regimes for market regulation and increased functions
for courts in managing reorganization and liquidation, for example through the establishment of
a new Commercial Court in Indonesia. These reforms exceed technical reforms and achieve a
“restructurin of the state itself” through injection of courts and reshuffling functions and power
among state institutions.
The influence of the United States as a donor of legal forms and procedures has been
examined in a pair of articles by Peter Katzenstein and Benjamin Brake. The first examines the
spread of private law procedures, specifically class action and discovery procedures.95 In the
second article, Goldbach, Brake and Katzenstein evaluate the movement of U.S. public law,
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specifically criminal and administrative legal procedures.96 Legal transplants of U.S. legal
procedures stand as an example of both U.S. power to export legal models, but also the
competition the U.S. faces in competing with other models and in on the ground translation.97
The movement of law across borders is situated in a world of material, social and intellectual
power which affects states’ ability to shape discourse about legal norms and make certain legal
norms available for transplant. However, legal transplants also point to choice of form, and
processes of translation, resistance and modification. Legal ideologies influence processes of
transplanting laws and often shape donor decisions on how to frame or package legal transplants.
The result of the movement of legal norms is often syncretic and polymorphic.
C. Choice and the “Compliance-Pull” of Reform
The transnational movement of U.S. style jury systems, in particular, is significant for what
legal transplants have to tell us about the distinctiveness of legal norms.98 Lay participation in the
criminal trial has seen a “rebirth”. Legal transplants of jury systems to post-authoritarian
countries has been channeled through socialization of foreign legal scholars from at U.S. law
schools,99 as well as at conferences,100 or through collaborative research networks. At least fifty-
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four countries use jury trials, including Russia and Spain, which recently reintroduced jury
trials.101 Several post-Soviet countries, including Armenia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Azerbaijan
enshrined a right to trial by jury in their constitutions.102 Georgia, which enacted legislation
enabling jury trials in 2009, modeled its jury system on U.S. juries and held its first criminal jury
trial in 2011.103
Court reforms of East Asian legal systems in the last decade exemplify the presence and
limits of power politics, but also highlight the latitude some recipients have in choosing from
various legal models. These point to the possibility that legal actors build fidelity and feelings of
obligation other than through adherence to procedural quality criteria. East Asian transplants of
jury and lay participation systems have been subjected to processes of showcasing, selection, and
translation. The resulting systems are syncretic and polymorphic, yet they receive a wide range
of support from both legal elites and members of the public.
Japan engaged in a process of investigating various models before instituting the Saiban-in
Seido.104 A sub-committee of the Osaka Bar Association's Committee for Judicial System
Reform toured the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, and several judges of the Supreme
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Court of Japan travelled to the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France
investigating potential lay participation transplants.105 Japan had a jury system from 1928 to
1943. And while Japan moved from a dossier-based trial to oral presentations in the recent
reforms, the resulting system includes more features reflective of a mixed judge/lay person106
model familiar to civil law jurisdictions.107 In serious criminal cases, six lay judges and three
professional judges decide questions of guilt and sentencing in criminal felony cases based on a
majority vote by the panel, where at least one citizen and one professional is in the majority.108
South Korea, often receptive to ideas and practices stemming from the United States,109
transplanted a version of U.S. jury system, translating features from both U.S. and German lay
participation models. Korean jurors deliberate separately from the judge, and prosecution and
defense have a limited number (five) of peremptory challenges but an unlimited number of
challenges for cause. In addition, South Korea incorporated alifornia’s rules on juror notetaking and questioning witnesses.110 The system differs, however, from the U.S. jury system in
the following respects: juries are composed of five, seven, or nine jurors in proportion to the
seriousness of a crime; where jurors cannot reach a unanimous decision on the verdict, they can
consult the presiding judge and then suggest a verdict based on a majority vote; and finally, the
jury is advisory, present recommendations which the judge can accept or reject.111
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In a surprising, recent development in support of the shadow jury system, the Supreme
Court of South Korea ruled in two decisions that, where a criminal case is tried by a jury and the
jury returns a unanimous verdict of not-guilty, an appellate court cannot reverse a lower court
jud e’s not-guilty verdict unless there is clear and convincing reason following a new
investigation of the evidence.112 This increase status and influence of the new jury transplant
supports Korea’s aspirational oals of citi en participation in decision makin , and points to
normative conceptual oals of the le al transplants. However, there’s also a sociolo ical story,
about processes of investigating and implementing transplants that might be relevant to
understanding compliance pull.
Plans for the introduction of a jury system were discussed in 1999 under the auspicious of
the Judicial Reform Steering Committee, organized by the Supreme Court of Korea. On October
28, 2003 a Judicial Reform Committee [Sabeopgaehyeok wiwonhoe] was created and on
December 15, 2004, the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reform [Sabeopjedogaehyeok
chujinwiwonhoe] was established to implement the recommendations. A plan for civil
participation was drafted in 2005, discussed by the National assembly in 2006, and an Act was
passed the followin year. The Supreme ourt also established a “Judicial Participation Plannin
Board” to conduct mock jury trials, videotape and analy e real jury trials, and run educational
sessions for the legal practitioners.
Existing research about compliance can be expanded by examining the process of
participating in legal reform and justice projects, as well as the allure or aesthetics of interacting
with law as an instrument.113 In other words, research might examine whether a connection to
law’s promise of reform and development may also contribute to compliance and feelin s of
fidelity. For example, Annelise Riles finds that human rights lawyers remain engaged and
embedded in their projects despite strong and widespread skepticism about the human rights
re ime’s ability to deliver. 114 Similarly, despite declarations that the law and development
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project of the 1980s was a failure,115 law and development and rule of law programs persist and
are now enterin their ‘third’ incarnation.116
Studies report positive associations following participation in legal institutions, highlighting
the connection between interaction and feelings of fidelity. For example jurors report higher
regard for courts, judges and the jury system following their trial experiences (Diamond, 1993).
In a U.S. national survey of over 8,000 former jurors, sixty-three percent reported that they were
more favorable about jury duty after serving. More than eighty-five percent of Croatian lay
judges had positive opinions about their participation. Moreover, lay judges believe they have a
substantial and beneficial impact on verdicts,117 despite studies which show that, even with
formal voting requirements, lay judges agree with and are likely to modify their opinion to
resolve disa reements with professional jud es (Kutnjak Ivković, 2007). Surveys of jurors in
South Korea’s new advisory jury system show similar positive views of their experience (Park,
2010), and in a study of Japanese citizen participation, ninety-four percent of the lay judge
respondents reported having a positive experience. Research design may be more complicated in
international settings, nevertheless these studies point to interesting ways to think about the
influence of legal participation.
IV. GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND INDETERMINATE LEGAL ORDERS
A. Power and Politics
Dispute processing and social regulation occur in multiple locations, in institutions and
organizations that draw on the symbols of law.118 Both formal and informal methods are being
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used to transnationally regulate the environment, security, health, immigration, and labor.119
Private and public120 actors govern through a variety of mechanisms that include domestic
administrative agencies and regimes structured by treaties or similar types of agreements. 121
Multiple overlapping jurisdictions subsist in laws, treaties, or other legal structures that
coordinate and facilitate cross border activity, and in judicial decisions that extend the territorial
application of regulations.122 And several international organizations and transnational
institutions intercede into state oversight through judicial review jurisdictions.123

119

Robert A. Kagan, Globalization and Legal Change: The ‘Americani ation’ of European Law? 1 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 99, 100 (2007); Saskia Sassen, De-Nationalized State Agendas and Privatized Norm-Making, in
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, 51, 52–53 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004). Examples of
global regulatory activity include UN Security Council regulation of movement of arms, food and money in
countries that are subject to sanctions; Security Council listing of individuals whose assets will be frozen under antiterrorism rules.
120
Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of “Private” and “Public” Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617, 633 (2011). See generally Riles, Collateral Knowledge (showing the
similarity in how participants in public and private institutions conceive of their regulatory activities).
121
GAL scholars identify five types of global administration – administration by formal IOs, collective action by
transnational networks, distributed administration by national regulators, by hybrid intergovernmental-private
arrangements, and by private institutions with regulatory functions. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard
B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, Foreword: Global Governance as Administration – National and Transnational
Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 20-21 (2005); Richard B. Stewart, U.S.
Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 69 (2005) (finding
three types of international regulatory regimes); Aman, supra note 113, at 2111-16 (discussin “Global Re ulatory
Discourse”).
122
Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 63, 75-77 (2005).
123
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 32 (2005). Robert A. Kagan, Globalization and Legal Change: The ‘Americanization’ of
European Law? 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 99, 106-107 (2007). In the case of the ECJ specifically, judicial review of
EU action is based on the same concept of legality as the French onseil d’Etat. The rounds for reviewin EU
action are based on the same “state-oriented or ani in concept” as French review of administrative actions; there
are four le ality rounds listed in the E. . Treaty: “lack of competence, infrin ement of an essential procedural
requirement, infrin ement of [the] Treaty or of any rule relatin to its application, or misuse of powers.” MITCHEL
DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE 229, 235
(2009). Review of state action has effectively been written into the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) under sections 1116 and 1117, which allow investors to bring claims for breach of substantive
obligations. Thus, a developer of a hazardous waste station was able to seek review by a NAFTA tribunal of a
Mexican provincial government decision to issue an Ecological Decree for the protection of a rare cactus; Metalclad
Corp. v. Mexico, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001); upheld Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 664 (2001). On the other
hand, judicial review of arbitration awards under NAFTA may be limited depending on which arbitration rules apply
to the investor’s claim; see e. . Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of

-23-

International and transnational communities create and give meaning to legal norms
throu h law’s “juris enerative power”, which allows for norm articulation in “multiple
overlapping jurisdictional assertions.”124 The collisions125 (Teubner), tensions and conflicts that
multiple legal orders and jurisdictional redundancies present suggest another important feature of
legal norms. The possibility of multiple as well as indeterminate legal orders, the relationships
between overlapping jurisdictional claims, and practices of constituting and recognizing legal
orders point to particular ways that law ensures fidelity.
Overlapping jurisdictions and indeterminate orders facilitate a particular kind of stability
and creative possibility. Berman refers to “dialectical dances” notin that “dialectical and
iterative interplays” will happen more often “as a variety of communities claim an interest in
regulating distant behavior having extraterritorial effects or as parties claim a community
affiliation beyond the local.”126 Research into legal norms distinctiveness should examine the
ways that the contests over legal norms create legitimacy over time. A brief survey of legal
pluralist orders suggests that recognition not as a rule but as a practice features in the
construction and stability of legal norms.
Legal pluralism was initially tied to an anthropolo ical interest in ‘traditional’ or ‘informal’
methods of social control and investigated parallel autonomous legal orders often in colonial or
post-colonial jurisdictions. Following on critiques of the way anthropology exoticized and
othered its research subjects, scholarship about legal pluralism delved into uncovering the ways
that colonial administrators constructed ‘traditional’ le al systems as a method of orderin and
regulating indigenous populations.127 Scholars uncovered the ways that elites codified and reified
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‘traditional’ indi enous practices for administrative or control purposes. “The creation of
colonial law was neither an innocuous nor a nonviolent act: For the colonizers, it created an
order that was categorically similar and thus could be subjected to their own law; for the elites
among the colonized, it opened up avenues toward reaffirming their own power.”128
In addition to highlighting ways that power was implicated in both legal and scholarly
projects, legal pluralism became wrapped up in debates about cultural relativism versus the quest
for a universal normative international legal order.129 Legal pluralism in this context represented
tolerance and acceptance, but it also advanced a poignant challenge to the le al order’s stability
by brin in into clear view law’s contin ency.
Scholarship into legal pluralism has shifted from studying informal disputing to examine
the ordering or regulation in non-state situations.130 Scholars focus on the interconnectedness of
social orders and the way that state law penetrates and restructures other normative orders. Legal
pluralism focuses on “conceptuali in a more complex and interactive relationship between
official and unofficial forms of orderin ” to see the ‘unofficial’ forms as part of a plural legal
order.”131 Law is no lon er the “exclusive artifact” of the nation state, but rather is produced by a
diverse set of groups and communities that operate globally to structure and regulate behavior.
Various sectors of society, including multinational enterprises, labor, human rights and the
internet, are “breakin the narrow frame of national law” and developin a lobal law in
isolation from the state.132
Le al pluralism’s second wave finds connections with narratives about lobali ation,
transnational private regulation and non-state governance. Most recently, Sally Merry joined
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Benedict Kingsburry – who is deeply involved in the Global Administrative Law (GAL) project
– and others at NYU on a project examinin the use of “indicators” as a technique of lobal
governance.133 The research agenda melds together issues in legal pluralism, international
political economy and techniques of control. As legal pluralism enters into the neoliberal arena,
there is now a rowin sense that ‘le al’ and ‘non-le al’ forms of social re ulation “have always
been part of the central make-up of le al theory.”134 A plurality of legal orders and a place for
non-state norms is now ‘common sense’. Legal pluralism “is no more a reality than legal
centralism, but rather is merely another (though potentially superior) representation of legal
reality.”135
In addition to examples of multiple overlapping jurisdictions, law offers several examples
of stable yet indeterminate legal regimes. The international human rights regime does not
indicate whether legal procedures by which defendants are to be tried ought to resemble
common-law, civil-law or mixed procedures.136 For example, the various human rights treaties
make no guarantees for the right to a trial by jury, nor do they establish firm guidelines
concerning the admissibility of evidence or the role of the adjudicator. The final agreement on
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Criminal Court (ICC) grants individual
adjudicators a considerable amount of discretion in choosing applicable procedures. In order to
secure support of the maximum number of member states, the final agreement avoids choosing a
particular tradition. Similarly, the Latvian public law reforms, rather than imposing a uniform
procedure, provided guidelines for agency decisions and allowed each agency to adopt
procedures as it sees fit.137
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B. Recognition as Mode of Norm-Making
Current approaches to understanding legal pluralism move beyond the dichotomy between
monist and pluralist concepts of law to emphasize that law is uniform and plural at the same time
(Michaels). In his discussion of a potential third paradigm for global legal pluralism, Ralf
Michaels interestingly proposes that law has this propensity toward order and coherence even in
the face of the blatant contingency that legal pluralism presents. Borrowing from systems theory
about recursivity and stability, Michaels argues that legal pluralism’s new direction would
inquire into the ways that multiple orders create stability and mutual reinforcement:
Legal pluralism suggests a third dimension – how legal systems create, through recognition,
other legal systems, and how the mutual recognition among legal systems in turn creates
stability (or the illusion of it). Legal pluralism allows for a relativism of position. This is
not the simple normative relativism (the recognition that norms may differ and the call for
tolerance)… Instead, it is an epistemic relativism in which law is constructed – not only by
communities for themselves, but especially by legal systems for each other.138
Michaels advocates adopting the concept of recognition as “a practice of the reco ni in
law” rather than understandin it as a rule or formal criterion for validity. “Reco nition, as a
juridical cate ory, is thus analy ed as a practice, an anthropolo ical cate ory…” Similarly,
David Kennedy suggests using legal pluralism as a method to uncover the gaps and biases, and
the effects of “the rule of experts” and “their routine work” which denies them “the experience of
discretion and responsibility and the rest of us the opportunity to challen e their action.”139
Shifting the focus to recognition as a practice opens up spaces to bring legal pluralism back
to the ‘le al centre’, back to the state and courts, not as instantiation of a monist le al order, but
rather as a site for investigating multiple practices. A focus on recognition also allows for an
examination of the ways that domestic state courts now exhibit core themes of legal pluralism –
the “irreducible plurality of le al orders in the world, the coexistence of domestic state law with
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other legal orders, the absence of a hierarchically superior position transcending the
differences.”140
Recognition as practice allows for an exploration into the boundaries of law by
investigating interactions between and effects of multiple legal orders in addition to proving that
multiple orders exist. Overlapping jurisdictional claims and indeterminate legal orders in global
regulation suggest another important feature of legal norm-making. In these competitive and
contingent legal spaces, legal actors and legal orders in a sense collaborate to mutually recognize
and stabilize multiple coexisting legal systems.
V. CONCLUSION: LEGAL DISTINCTIVENESS?
The paper proposes that transnational legal processes and their modes of collaborative
norm-making may be additional sites to learn about the ways that law achieves its ‘stickiness.’
The relationships between donors and recipients of legal transplants suggest that in competitive
and power infused legal spaces, syncretism and practices of translation are ways that legal actors
collaborate to integrate legal norms. The persistence of indeterminate legal orders and the
interactions between overlapping jurisdictional claims indicates that recognition as a practice
may be another mode of collaborative norm-making which stabilizes legal norms.
But what does this have to tell us about the distinctiveness of legal norms?141 Following on
Merry’s su

estion to “study up”, the paper concludes with some preliminary thou hts on

knowledge practices in law and what the modes of collaborative norm-making in transnational
le al processes have tell us about law’s distinctiveness.
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A. Attachment to Instrumentalism
Rudolf von Jherin remarked that transplantin le al institutions is a matter “of usefulness
and need. No one bothers to fetch a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home,
[and] only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grow in his back garden.142” The
first knowledge practice to consider is the attraction or fascination – among academics and legal
practitioners – with law reform, legal change and legal instrumentalism. The fascination with law
reform presents not merely in changing law that reflects changing circumstances (e.g. climate
change) or changing attitudes (e.g. same-sex marriage), but also in the new legal ways that we
posit to solve (old) problems. Despite the “failure” of the welfare state, the failure of law and
development, the critique of judges and the courts, legal actors maintain a vision of law “as a set
of problem-solvin institutions and of le al techniques”. To think like a lawyer, writes Riles, “is
to think of law as a tool or a means to an end, whether one imagines law as a tool of social
justice or a tool of corporate interests.”143
Instrumentalism in legal transplants is solidly entrenched in a broader history of legal
thinking, particularly in the United States, which has come to see law as a tool.144 Law is a
“social instrument,” where the social reality is malleable and can be altered “by humans for
human purposes in the course of solvin problems.”145 It is a technology that lawmakers – as
social engineers – employ to achieve external sociological goals. Law is a means to serve social
ends even if different people disa ree about the “ri ht oals” to pursue or the “ri ht ways” to
pursue them.
With respect to IL, Kleinfeld writes that law acts as a bridge between the hypothetical and
the actual, it “stands in a special relationship to consequences in the world” in a way that most
forms of discourse do not. Law has real world consequences, “brin in them to pass in virtue of
imperatives suffused with a certain sort of power.” Does this sense of obli ation and
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commitment to problem solving, the creativity in and impulse to invent varieties of normative
technologies146 stand as a source for law’s distinctiveness?
B. Contingency and Expectations
A second way to think about knowledge practices in law is to examine the curious way that
legal norms are able to function in indeterminate and multiple legal orders. Both Michaels and
Berman suggest that multiple jurisdictional claims generate greater possibilities for creativity
and stability in legal norm-making. For their thinking about global legal pluralism, Michaels and
Gunther Teubner clearly borrow from sociological systems theory.147 I conclude with a closer
look at those claims and what they add to thinkin about le al norms’ distinctiveness.
Niklas Luhmann engaged in several sociological accounts of systems theory in law.148 In A
Sociological Theory of Law, Luhmann investigates the particular ways that legal norms manage
and coordinate expectations.149 He argues that the distinction scholars make between the
normative and the factual should be replaced with a distinction between normative and cognitive
expectations and their place in the handling of disappointment. Cognitive expectations are those
that can be changed in the face of contradicting information, whereas we do not reject normative
expectations even if someone acts against them. 150 Normative expectations “si nify the
determination not to learn from disappointments.”151
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Norms are thus ‘counterfactually stabilised behavioural expectations’ and they have
unconditional validity independent of actual fulfillment or non-fulfillment.152 In other words, the
fact of whether the expectation is met or not met is not relevant. Stable normative expectations
do not guarantee a particular future, but rather manage the unpredictability of the future,
allowing for stability in the face of discrepant events.153 Legal norms supervise this process, by
creating counterfactual, disappointment-prepared and normative expectations.154
Law provides ‘security’ in protectin expectations and “immunizing” society against a
necessary risk. Law does this not only by positing a general statement of expectations that do
not have to be adjusted, but also by justifying conduct retrospectively and then, for example in
adjudication, by determining which party will need to adjust expectations (changing seemingly
normative expectations to cognitive expectations). Legal systems provide structures that are both
formally operational and that are able to track and record “patterns of hope, experience and
decisions.”155 My sense is that legal norms are distinctive in their particular ability to combine
past and present, practical and normative, skepticism and hope.
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